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THE EMPLOYER'S "BERMUDA TRIANGLE":
AN ANALYSIS OF THE INTERSECTION BETWEEN
WORKERS' COMPENSATION, ADA, AND FMLA
GREGORY G. PiNsKi
ANGELA L. RUD*
"Wouldst thou," so the helmsman answered,
"Know the secret of the sea?"
Only those who brave its dangers,
Comprehend its mystery.
Henry Wadsworth Longfellow
The Bermuda Triangle, the expanse of ocean bounded by the island
of Bermuda, the southern tip of Florida, and Puerto Rico, has long been
a mysterious place of danger for sea navigators.1 Employers today face
their own Bermuda Triangle 2: the area of law bounded by the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"),3 the Family and Medical Leave Act
("FMLA"),4 and state workers' compensation statutes. Employers who
brave the dangers of this sea must understand when and how each law
applies.
The trichotomy created by these three laws is clear from the purpos-
es of the laws. Specifically, as this analysis illustrates, each law has a
purpose distinct from that of the other two: the FMLA provides an
entitlement not to work; the ADA promotes continued work; and
workers' compensation laws compensate employees who cannot work.
* The authors are labor and employment attorneys with the firm of Gray, Plant, Mooty, Mooty &
Bennett, P.A. in Minneapolis, Minnesota. Both represent and advise employers in all areas of
employment law, including discrimination, sexual harassment, ADA and FMLA compliance, and
workers' compensation. Angela Rud is a 1993 graduate of the University of Kansas School of Law.
Gregory G. Pinski is a 1999 graduate of the University of North Dakota School of Law. Special
thanks to the firm of Gray, Plant, Mooty for the resources to publish this article.
1. See Howard L. Rosenberg, Exorcizing the Devil's Triangle (visited Mar. 6, 2000) <http://
www.history.navy.mil/faqs/faq8-3.htm>. In just the past 50 years, more than 50 ships and 20 planes
have mysteriously disappeared in this area. Id.
2. See generally Myron B. Charfoos, Workers' Compensation and the ADA/FMLA: Issues and
Solutions, ABA INSTrrTE ON THE AMERICANS WrH DISABxLrrmEs AcT, Feb. 1998, at 1 (referring to the
interrelationship of workers' compensation, FMLA and ADA as a "Bermuda Triangle").
3. Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (1994) [hereinafter "ADA"].
4. Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2601 (1994) [hereinafter "FMLA"].
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Despite these differences, however, all three laws also have a central
purpose: to allow sick, disabled, or injured employees to take time away
from work without fear of losing their jobs. To this end, an employer
must not only determine if an injured worker is entitled to workers'
compensation benefits, but it must also determine if the employee is
"disabled" as defined by the ADA or suffers from a "serious health
condition" under the FMLA.5 This analysis will examine how both the
coverage provisions and the benefits requirements of the ADA, FMLA,
and workers' compensation statutes put employers in a difficult position
because of the tension between the overall goals of the laws.
I. INTRODUCTION AND PURPOSES OF THE THREE LAWS
Each of the regulatory schemes discussed in this Article has its own
purpose, which differs from that of the other two. It is necessary to
understand the purpose of each law to understand how they fit together,
which this Article addresses.
First, the ADA was enacted in 1990 as a comprehensive federal
social policy to prevent disability discrimination and to integrate dis-
abled citizens into the workplace. 6 The law prohibits discrimination
against a qualified disabled individual in connection with a job applica-
tion; hiring, advancement, or discharge of an employee; employee com-
pensation; job training; and other terms, conditions, and privileges of
employment. 7
The FMLA,- contrarily, was enacted by Congress in 1993 in re-
sponse to the increasing number of single-parent households and two-
parent households in which both parents are employed.8 The FMLA
permits an employee to take leave for a serious health condition or for
compelling family reasons; in this way, Congress attempted to strike a
balance between the family's needs and the demands of the workplace. 9
Finally, workers' compensation is a "non-fault mechanism for pro-
viding cash-wage benefits and medical care to victims of work-connected
injuries, and for placing the cost of these injuries ultimately on the con-
sumer, through the medium of insurance, whose premiums are passed on
5. Joan T.A. Gabel et al., The New Relationship Between Injured Worker and Employer: An
Opportunity for Restructuring the System, 35 AM. Bus. L. J. 403, 404 (1998).
6. See ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(4) (1994).
7. See ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1994).
8. See FMLA, 29 U.S.C. § 2601(a)(1) (1994).
9. See Gabel et al., supra note 5, at 423.
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in the cost of the product."10 Unlike the ADA and FMLA, workers'
compensation is controlled by the law of individual states.
II. EMPLOYER COVERAGE PROVISIONS
Not all employers are covered by the ADA, FMLA, and workers'
compensation statutes at the same time. The requirements for employ-
ers' coverage under each of the statutes are different and depend on the
size of the employers' workforce.ll
The ADA, for example, applies to private employers with fifteen or
more employees each working day for twenty weeks in the current or
preceding calendar year.12 Additionally, state and local government
units are covered regardless of their size. However, the United States
government, corporations wholly owned by the United States, Indian
tribes, and bona fide private membership clubs are not covered.13
The FMLA applies to employers who employ fifty or more em-
ployees each working day for twenty or more calendar work weeks in
the current or preceding calendar year.14 The statute also applies to
public agencies, including state and local governments, regardless of the
number of employees.15
As mentioned, workers' compensation coverage is determined by
individual state law. For purposes of this analysis, the state of Minnesota
will be used as an example. In that state, an employer who employs one
employee must follow the state's Workers' Compensation Act.16
10. ARTHUR LARSON, WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND TEXT, § I, at I (2d
ed. 1997).
11. If an employer is covered by more than one statute, the employer is obligated to follow the
law that provides the most protection to its employees. 29 C.F.R. § 825.702(a) (1999).
12. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(e)(1) (1999).
13. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111; 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(e)(2).
14. 29 C.F.R. §§ 825.104(a), 825.600 (1999). The number of employees includes those who are
part time and those on leave, if they are still on the payroll. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.105 (1999). On the
other hand, those employees who are on layoff, whether temporary or permanent, do not count toward
the minimum of 50. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.105(c) (1999).
15. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.104(a) (1999).
16. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 176.021, subd. I (Supp. 2000). 'Employer' is defined by Minnesota law
to include: corporations; partnerships; limited liability companies; associations; groups of persons; state,
county, town, or city governments; school districts; or other governmental subdivisions. See MNN.
STAT. ANN. § 176.011, subd. 10 (Supp. 2000).
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III. EMPLOYEE COVERAGE PROVISIONS
Under certain circumstances, the fact that an employer is subject to
one of the laws discussed herein does not necessarily mean that its
employees will also be subject to that law. Each law has its own re-
quirements to determine if an employee is covered, which is a different
inquiry than determining if an employer is covered.
First, the ADA protects qualified individuals with a disability from
discrimination as to all terms, conditions, and privileges of employ-
ment. 17 The legislation requires that the employee be able to perform
the essential functions of his or her job, with or without reasonable
accommodation. 18 Reasonable accommodations for qualified individu-
als with a disability can include granting unpaid leave, making changes
to the employer's existing facilities, or some type of change in the job
itself.19 Nevertheless, an employer is not required to offer a reasonable
accommodation if it would impose an undue hardship on the business,
such as significant difficulty or expense.20
In order to be eligible for FMLA coverage, an employee must have
1) worked for the employer for at least twelve months, although not
necessarily twelve consecutive months; 2) worked at least 1,250 hours
during the twelve-month period preceding the beginning of leave; and
17. See ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1994). Disability is defined by the law to include: 1) a
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities; 2) a record of
such an impairment; or 3) being regarded as having such an impairment. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g)
(1999). Major life activities include, but are not limited to, such tasks as caring for oneself,
performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working. See
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (1999). Factors used to determine whether an individual is substantially limited
include the nature and severity of the impairment, the duration or expected duration of the impairment,
and the expected long-term impact resulting from the impairment. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2)
(1999). Finally, the inability to perform a single, particular job, or even a narrow range of jobs, is not a
substantial limitation to the major life activity of working. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3) (1999).
18. See ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (1994). Essential functions of a job are the fundamental job
duties, not including marginal functions, of the employment position the individual with a disability
holds or desires. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n) (1999). When determining whether a job function is
essential, the following factors may be considered: 1) the employer's judgment as to which functions
are essential; 2) written job descriptions; 3) the amount of time required to perform the job function; 4)
the consequences of not performing the particular job function; 5) terms of a collective bargaining
agreement; and 6) the past and current work experience of those in the same or similar positions. See
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3) (1999).
19. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(2) (1999). Such job changes could include, but are not limited to,
shifting marginal job functions to other employees, a part-time or modified work schedule, modifying
equipment, reassigning the employee to a vacant position, or providing qualified readers or inter-
preters. Id.
20. See ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b); see also ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 1211 1(10)(A) & (B) (1994).
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3) worked at a worksite where fifty or more employees are employed by
the employer within seventy-five miles of the worksite. 2 1 For such
employees, the law provides up to twelve weeks of leave during any
twelve month period in four circumstances: 1) for the birth of a child or
to care for the newborn child; 2) for placement of a child with the
employee for adoption or foster care; 3) to care for the employee's
spouse, child, or parent who has a serious health condition; or 4) because
the employee's own serious health condition 22 makes the employee
unable to perform the functions of the employee's job.23
Finally, workers' compensation laws simply require that an individ-
ual was employed at the time of the work-related injury and that the
injury arose out of and was within, the course of employment. 24 The
provisions apply to full-time employees as well as to part-time and
temporary workers. 25 The employee bears the burden of proving that
employment was the major cause of the injury in order to obtain
coverage. 26
IV. SPECIFIC AREAS OF CONFLICT BETWEEN THE ADA, FMLA,
AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION
There are several areas of employment law in which these three
statutes conflict. These conflicts are considered in the following sections,
beginning with the different leave requirements imposed by the laws.
This review is followed by a series of suggestions for avoiding such
conflicts.
21. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.110(a) & (b) (1999).
22. Federal regulations define "serious health condition" as any illness, injury, impairment, or
physical or mental condition that involves inpatient care or continuing treatment by a health care
provider. 29 C.F.R. § 825.114(a) (1999). This does not include routine preventative examinations,
most cosmetic treatments, or short-term or common illnesses requiring limited treatment. See id. The
law defines "continuing treatment by a health care provider" to be met by a period of incapacity of
more than three consecutive days during which the individual with the health condition is treated at
least two times by a health care provider, or one time if a continuing regiment of treatment is
established. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.114 (1999). A "regimen of treatment" may include taking
over-the-counter or prescription medication at a health care provider's direction, but simply taking
over-the-counter medication without a visit to a doctor is not adequate to constitute a regimen of
treatment. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.114(b) (1999). Some conditions are covered regardless of the length
of time of incapacity, such as pregnancy or prenatal care or a chronic condition such as cancer. See
29 C.F.R. § 825.114(a)(2)(ii), (iii) (1999).
23. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.112(a) (1999).
24. See MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 176.021, subd. I (West 1993 & Supp. 2000).
25. Id.
26. See Fox v. Micro Mach., 462 N.W.2d 592, 593 (Minn. 1990) (explaining that an employee
must prove by a fair preponderance that his or her injury was compensable).
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A. VARYING LEAVE REQUIREMENTS
Under the ADA, an employer is not required to grant leave to an
employee, but interpretations of the statute address leave as a possible
reasonable accommodation. 27 Thus, in certain situations, flexible or
intermittent leave may be considered a reasonable accommodation when
employees with disabilities require time off from work due to dis-
ability.28 As such, if the aforementioned requirements of the FMLA are
met, an employer may count such leave under the twelve weeks granted
by that statute. While leave as a reasonable accommodation may need to
extend beyond the twelve-week FMLA entitlement, employers are not
required to extend the leave if doing so would pose an undue hardship
to the business. 29
FMLA leave requirements often intersect with leave under workers'
compensation laws. Under the FMLA, employers must provide eligible
employees up to twelve weeks of leave in a twelve-month period. 30
Before designating such leave under the FMLA, however, an employer
must give notice to the employee that it will be counted against the
twelve-week entitlement. 31 Conflicts and problems arise, however, when
an on-the-job injury qualifies as a serious health condition. In such a
situation, federal regulations permit FMLA leave to run concurrent with
workers' compensation leave. 32 However, this is not an easy task for
employers. As one commentator acknowledged,
In practice . . . , employers report heavy administrative bur-
dens. Large employers, who can have hundreds or thousands
of employees off at any given time, strain under the require-
ments that an on-the-job injury be medically certified as a
27. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o) (1999).
28. See, e.g., Weiler v. Household Fin. Corp., 101 F.3d 519, 526 (7th Cir. 1996) (stating that the
employer's decision to grant short-term and extended leave was a reasonable accommodation);
Hawkins v. The Gap, Inc., 84 F.3d 797 (6th Cir. 1995) (affirming a summary judgment decision
holding that an employee who was granted leave was reasonably accommodated).
29. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(p) (1999). Under the ADA, an employee has no absolute right to
additional leave beyond the 12 weeks guaranteed by the FMLA. Id.
30. See FMLA, 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(l)(D) (1994).
31. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.208(a) (1999). Employers are required to provide notice in three ways:
I) by posting a notice; 2) by providing FMLA information in a written handbook or similar document;
and 3) by giving notice of the specific obligations of an employee when FMLA leave begins. See 29
C.F.R. §§ 825.300, 825.301 (1999).
32. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.208 (1999) (regulating when an employer may require that paid leave be
counted as FMLA leave).
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serious health condition and that employees receive advance
notice that their workers' compensation absences will count as
FMLA leave.33
Thus, there are significant differences between the leave requirements of
the ADA as the one hand, and the FMLA and workers' compensation
statutes on the other.
B. EMPLOYER ACCESS TO MEDICAL EXAMINATIONS AND RELATED
INFORMATION
Another area of conflict between the three laws concerns medical
information. Each of the statutes differs as to the amount of information
an employer may request to verify the physical or mental condition that
triggered the employee's absence from work. 34
Under the ADA, employers are not permitted to require an appli-
cant for work to undergo a medical examination to determine if he or
she is an individual with a disability or to assess the severity or nature of
a disability. 35 An employer may, however, require an applicant to
demonstrate or describe how he or she would perform the essential
functions of the job, assuming that all applicants must make the same
demonstration regardless of disability.36 Further, after an employment
offer has been made, but before the individual has started work, an
employer may require a medical examination to identify the nature and
severity of a disability. 37 However, once an employee begins work, any
medical examination must be job-related and consistent with business
necessity. 38
Contrarily, the FMLA permits an employer to require certification
of an employee's serious health condition. 39 However, the employer
must pay for such an examination by the employee's health care
provider, and it may only request information contained in the
Department of Labor's Medical Certification Statement.40
33. Joan T.A. Gabel & Nancy R. Mansfield, Practicing in the Evolving Landscape of Workers'
Compensation Law, THE LAB. LAW., Summer 1998, at 87.
34. Despite the conflict, the statute that provides the most generous protection is the one an
employer must follow in any particular case. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.702(a) (1999).
35. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.13(a) (1999).
36. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(a) (1999).
37. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(b) (1999).
38. See ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4) (1994).
39. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.305(a) (1999).
40. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.306(a) (1999). If an employer has doubts concerning the original
20001
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Finally, under most workers' compensation laws, an employer has
the right to require one or more independent medical examinations of
an employee. 41 Similar to FMLA examinations, workers' compensation
exams are paid for by the employer and can only be used to determine
whether the employee is entitled to benefits, should continue receiving
benefits, or has reached maximum medical improvement.42
Given these general rules regarding the administration of medical
examinations, conflicts between the laws arise most often when both the
ADA and FMLA apply and an employer attempts to discern information
about an employee's workers' compensation history.
First, when both the ADA and FMLA apply, there is a conflict over
the choice of physician. Under the ADA, medical examinations must be
administered by the employer's physician. 43 In contrast, the FMLA
limits medical certifications to those by the employee's health care
provider. 44 Complicating matters further is the fact that an FMLA certi-
fication exam is a health verification distinct from the ADA-prescribed
exam. 45 In such a dual coverage situation, the FMLA implies that an
employee may be required to meet the fitness requirements of both the
FMLA and ADA, and the employer must comply with the "require-
ments under the [ADA] . . . that any return-to-work-physical be
job-related." 46
Finally, conflicts often arise when an employer seeks a pre-employ-
ment-offer examination-permitted, as previously discussed, under the
ADA-and the employer attempts to ascertain information about an
employee's workers' compensation history. 47
Such inquiries inherently conflict with the ADA, which only allows
"inquiries into the ability of an applicant to perform job-related fun-
ctions." 48 If such questions are asked, however, and an employee is
subsequently not hired, a retaliation claim under the relevant workers'
certification, the regulations permit two additional certifications at the employer's expense. See 29
C.F.R. § 825.307(a)(2), (c) (1999).
41. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 176.155 (West 1993).
42. See id.
43. ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(3)-(4) (1994).
44. 29 C.F.R. § 825.305(a) (1999).
45. See Porter v. United States Alumoweld Co., 125 F.3d 243, 246 (4th Cir. 1997).
46. Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 825.310(c) (1999)).
47. See Downs v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., 13 F. Supp. 2d 130, 138 (D. Mass. 1998).
48. ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(2)(B) (1994).
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compensation statute often follows. 49 Thus, inquiries into workers'
compensation may trigger ADA claims. 50
C. RETURN TO WORK CONFLICTS BETWEEN THE LAWS
Another common area of conflict between the ADA, FMLA, and
workers' compensation arises when an employee who is covered under
one or all three laws returns to work. Each of the laws imposes different
duties for considering reinstatement, reassignment, and light duty work.
As previously discussed, leave is not, in and of itself, a requirement
under the ADA, but it may be required as an accommodation. 51 If leave
was taken as an accommodation, reinstatement to the employee's former
position is only required if the employee is qualified to perform the
essential functions of the job with or without reasonable accommoda-
tion. 52 Further, the ADA does not require reinstatement if it would pose
an undue hardship to the employer.53
Employers also may wish to reassign a returning employee to a
vacant position. The EEOC has declared that such reassignment may be
considered a reasonable accommodation of the type required by the
ADA if both the employer and employee agree that reassignment is
more appropriate than accommodation in the present position.S4
Light duty work may also be offered as a possible accommodation,
but the creation of light duty positions and permanent light duty assign-
ments are not required as a reasonable accommodation. 55 Nevertheless,
if an employee requests light duty work, at least one court has held that
an employer's failure to determine whether any light duty assignments
were available can be an indication of bad faith.56
FMLA regulations require that upon returning from FMLA leave,
an employee is entitled to be returned either to the same position the
employee held when leave commenced or to an equivalent position with
49. See Downs, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 142.
50. Id.
51. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
52. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.702(c)(1) (1999).
53. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.702(b) (1999) (providing that a reasonable accommodation need not im-
pose an undue hardship on the employer's business).
54. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o) (1999).
55. See Turco v. Hoechst Celanese Corp., 101 F.3d 1090, 1094 (5th Cir. 1996).
56. See Harrison v. Landis Plastics, Inc., No. 97-C7094, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11311, at *22
(N.D. 111. July 23, 1998).
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equivalent pay, benefits, and other terms and conditions of employ-
ment.57 Employers can accommodate this reinstatement requirement in
a variety of ways if the employee's job is no longer vacant or available.
For instance, the employer may create a new position for either the
returning employee or the employee who filled the job during FMLA
leave. 58 The employer could also promote the employee who is return-
ing from leave or transfer another employee to create a vacancy in the
same or an equivalent position. 59
The FMLA permits only three situations in which an employer can
deny reinstatement to a returning employee: 1) if the employer can
show that the employee would not have been employed at the time of the
reinstatement due to elimination of the job; 2) if the employee is a
highly compensated key employee who received appropriate notice of
key employee status and whose reinstatement is being denied in order to
prevent "substantial and grievous economic injury" to the company; 60
and 3) if the employee is unable to perform the essential functions of the
job.61
In contrast, under most workers' compensation statutes, an employ-
ee is not entitled to reinstatement to his or her former position; rather,
workers' compensation laws focus on the return to "suitable" work.62
As with the ADA, this may include light duty work. Under Minnesota
law, for example, light duty work is not required, but an employee who
unreasonably refuses an offer of suitable work, including light duty
57. 29 C.F.R. § 825.214(a) (1999). An employee is entitled to such reinstatement even if the
employer has hired someone else to fill the job or changed the job to accommodate the employee's
absence. See id. Likewise, there is no provision of the FMLA that conditions a plaintiff's right to
restoration to his or her job on the ability to perform the essential duties of a position without a
reasonable accommodation, as might be possible under the ADA. See Harrison, 1998 U.S. Dist. LExts
11311, at *27 n.3.
58. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.204 (1999).
59. See id.
60. The regulations define a "key employee" as one who is in the highest-paid 10% of the
employer's workforce within 75 miles of the employee's work location. 29 C.F.R. § 825.21.7(c)
(1999). Despite the possible denial of reinstatement, a key employee is entitled to take FMLA leave
and is entitled to all of the benefits of leave, including continued health coverage. See 29 C.F.R. §
825.219(c) (1999).
61. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.312 (1999). The FMLA utilizes the ADA's analytical framework to
determine an employee's ability to perform the essential functions of the job. 29 C.F.R. § 825.115
(1999).
62. See Karst v. F.C. Hayer Co., 447 N.W.2d 180, 186 (Minn. 1989) (noting that, unlike Wiscon-
sin, Minnesota does not have a statutory provision guaranteeing reinstatement to an employee on
workers' compensation-related leave).
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assignments, risks losing workers' compensation benefits.63 When such
a situation arises, and the employee is covered by the FMLA, an employ-
er cannot require that the worker take a modified job.64 While the
employer may suspend workers' compensation benefits, the employer
may still face an impending FMLA claim. 65
D. TERMINATION OF A COVERED EMPLOYEE
Termination of an employee covered by one or more of the laws
poses additional problems for employers. Although the laws encourage
employers to assist an employee who has suffered a serious illness,
disability, or injury, business necessity sometimes dictates that an em-
ployee who can no longer work should be terminated. 66
Under the ADA, an employee may be terminated because he or she
cannot perform the essential functions of the job with or without reason-
able accommodation. 67 An employee may also be terminated under the
ADA for violations of workplace conduct or performance standards if
those standards are job-related and consistent with business necessity.68
Conflicts between the laws often arise when an employee is habitual-
ly absent from work. If such an absence meets the FMLA requirements,
then the employee is entitled to twelve weeks of leave and reinstatement
to the position. 69 Under the ADA, however, a disabled employee who is
unable to have reasonably consistent attendance may not be considered a
qualified individual with a disability. Most courts recognize that regular
attendance is an essential job function, and that accommodating a dis-
abled employee's irregular attendance may impose an undue hardship.70
63. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 176.101, subd. 3e(b) (West 1993).
64. Gabel & Mansfield, supra note 33, at 88.
65. Gabel & Mansfield, supra note 33, at 88 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 825.207(d)(2) (1996)).
66. Business necessity cannot serve as a proxy for retaliation. All three laws prohibit retaliation
against employees who exercise their rights. See FMLA, 29 U.S.C. § 2615 (1994) (prohibiting retalia-
tion against, and interference with, an employee's exercise of FMLA rights); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.12
(1999) (prohibiting retaliation under the ADA against employees who make a charge or otherwise
participate in any investigation or proceeding or hearing to enforce the ADA); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
176.82 (Supp. 2000) (prohibiting retaliation or interference with an employee who exercises their
rights under the Minnesota Workers' Compensation Act).
67. See ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (1994). Factors that may be considered in determining
whether a particular job function is "essential" include: written job descriptions; work experiences of
others in the same job in the past; current work experience of those in similar jobs; and the terms of a
collective bargaining agreement, if applicable. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3) (1999).
68. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.10, 1630.15(c) (1999).
69. See FMLA, 29 U.S.C. § 2614(a) (1994); see also FMLA, 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a) (1994).
70. See, e.g., Halperin v. Abacus Tech. Corp., 128 F.3d 191, 197 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding that the
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Nevertheless, an employer must still engage in the reasonable accom-
modation dialogue with the employee.71 For example, in Haschmann v.
Time Warner Entertainment Company,72 the plaintiff, who suffered from
lupus, took several weeks of medical leave. 73 When she returned to work,
her performance began to suffer and she requested another two to four
weeks of leave.74 The employer denied the request and terminated the
plaintiff for poor attendance. 75 Although the court acknowledged that
an employer is not obligated to tolerate erratic, unreliable attendance, it
must make a good faith effort reasonably to accommodate the plaintiff's
disability. 76 In holding the employer liable, the court set forth the basic
test for determining whether an individual may be discharged for
excessive absences under the ADA: "[I]t is not the absence itself, but
rather the frequency of an employee's absences in relation to that
employee's job responsibilities that may lead to a finding that an
employee is unable to perform the duties of his job."77
Under workers' compensation statutes, if an employee's injury is
such that he or she cannot return to work at all, permanent total disability
benefits will be paid until the employee reaches age sixty-seven even if
the employee is terminated because of habitual absences or inability to
work. 78
When the laws conflict in this manner, employers must be increasing-
ly cautious in terminating covered employees. When work injuries lead
to any cognizable form of discrimination under the ADA, the law pro-
vides for backpay, reinstatement, frontpay, injunctive relief, attorney's
fees, damages for emotional distress, punitive damages, and liquidated
damages.79 Thus, as the EEOC Guidance provides,
Because the ADA enables an injured worker to sue for work-
ers' compensation benefits, along with tort damages and equita-
ble relief, employers are no longer insulated as envisioned in
inability to work on a regular basis meant that the plaintiff could not perform any functions of the job);
Bultemeyer v. Fort Wayne Community Schs., 100 F.3d 1281, 1284 (7th Cir. 1996) (stating that the
ability to report to work is an essential job function).
71. See Haschmann v. Time Warner Entertainment Co., 151 F.3d 591, 601 (7th Cir. 1998).
72. 151 F.3d 591 (7th Cir. 1998).
73. See Haschmann v. Time Warner Entertainment Co., 151 F.3d 591, 595 (7th Cir. 1998).
74. See id.
75. See id.
76. See id.
77. Id. at 602.
78. See MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 176.101(4) (Supp. 2000).
79. See EEOC Compliance Manual (BNA), Americans with Disabilities Act No. 236, at 0:2402-
03 (1998) (citing ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12117).
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the original workers' compensation concept .... The 'value'
of a claim is increased by the threat of ADA litigation,
regardless of whether any discrimination has taken place.80
Thus, employers must be especially cautious when considering termina-
tion of a covered employee.8 l
E. ABROGATION OF THE EXCLUSIvE REMEDY DOCTRINE
One of the typical hallmarks of workers' compensation law is the
exclusiveness of the compensation remedy. As Arthur Larson explains,
Once a workers' compensation act has become applicable...
it affords the exclusive remedy for the injury by the employee
or his dependents against the employer and insurance carrier.
This is part of the quid pro quo in which the sacrifices and
gains of employees and employers are to some extent put in
balance, for while the employer assumes a new liability without
fault, he is relieved of the prospect of large damage verdicts.8 2
When an injured employee receives workers compensation benefits and
also happens to be covered by the ADA or FMLA, however, the tradi-
tional exclusive remedy doctrine may not apply, for several reasons.
A federal district court in Wood v. County of Alameda8 3 considered
this precise question when an employer attempted to argue that the
exclusive remedy provision of California's workers compensation law
prevented recovery under the ADA. In determining whether the ADA
could preempt this provision, the court relied on the two-part test em-
ployed by the United States Supreme Court in Adams Fruit Co. v.
Barrett.84 Accordingly, the court in Wood considered two questions:8 5
First, the court considered whether the ADA explicitly or implicitly
indicates that Congress intended to defer to state law in situations like the
80. Gahel & Mansfield, supra note 33, at 85.
81. Gabel & Mansfield, supra note 33, at 85.
82. LARsoN, supra note 10, § 69.10, at 557.
83. 875 F. Supp. 659 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
84. Wood v. County of Alameda, 875 F. Supp. 659, 662 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (citing Adams Fruit Co.
v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638 (1990)). In Adams Fruit, the Supreme Court considered whether an exclusive
remedy provision in a state workers' compensation case precluded an action under the federal
Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act. Id. (citing Adam's Fruit, 494 U.S. at 638).
In that case, the Court held that federal law preempts state law to the limited extent that it does not
permit states to supplant, rather than to supplement, the federal statute's remedial scheme. Id. (quoting
Adams Fruit, 494 U.S. at 648-49).
85. Id. at 662 (citing Adams Fruit, 494 U.S. at 642).
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one at issue.8 6 After answering this question negatively, the court
considered whether preemption principles mandated that all or part of
the state law be denied effect in light of Congress' intent in enacting the
federal law.8 7
First, the court found that Congress did not intend for the ADA to
defer to state workers' compensation law.8 8 In looking at Congress'
intent, the court concluded that the ADA seeks to "ensure that plaintiffs
are not denied the benefits of compatible state statutes on the ground
that the ADA precludes any cause of action under the state law."8 9
Thus, it concluded that Congress did not intend to defer to state law.
Then, despite finding that dual compensation could be allowed
under both laws, the court also examined the effect of preemption
principles on the issue. 90 In finding that the ADA preempts the exclu-
sive remedy provision, the court found that the state provision would be
an obstacle to the congressional objective behind the ADA, primarily the
elimination of discrimination against disabled persons. 9 1 The court
concluded that the objectives of the ADA would be further weakened if
each state were allowed effectively to supersede the ADA by placing
exclusivity provisions in its statutes. 92
Finally, at least one commentator has suggested a further reason
why the workers' compensation exclusive remedy structure does not
preclude an ADA claim: Exclusive remedy provisions in state workers'
compensation laws apply only to civil actions against the employer for
employment-related injuries. 93 A charge of disability discrimination, on
the other hand, would not be inconsistent because it would not be
seeking additional recovery for an injury. 94 Rather, it would be seeking
recovery for an employer's alleged failure to comply with the require-
ments of the ADA.95 Thus, recovery could be permitted under both
statutes despite the exclusive remedy provision.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 664.
89. Id.
90. See id. at 665.
91. See id.
92. Id.
93. Ranko Shiraki Oliver, The Impact of Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 on
Workers' Compensation Law, 16 U. ARK. LrrnrE ROCK L. J. 327, 370 (1994).
94. Id. at 370-71.
95. Id. at 371.
[VOL. 76:69
WORKERS' COMPENSATION, ADA, AND FMLA
F. JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL: Is IT INCONSISTENT TO SEEK TOTAL
DISABILITY BENEFITS AND CLAIM PROTECTION UNDER THE ADA?
A final conflict between the ADA and workers' compensation is
found in the competing goals of these two laws. Under workers' com-
pensation, and other disability programs such as social security, an
injured employee represents that he or she is unable to work.9 6 In
contrast, when the same employee seeks a remedy under the ADA, he or
she represents that he or she is an individual with a disability that could
work with or without reasonable accommodation.97 Such an apparent
contradiction often leads employers to argue the doctrine of judicial
estoppel. 98 This doctrine is based on the equitable principle that "if a
party wins a suit on one ground, it can't turn around and in further
litigation with the same opponent repudiate the ground in order to win a
further victory." 99
1. Cleveland v. Policy Management Systems Corporation
This question of whether the receipt of disability benefits precludes
ADA relief was recently before the United States Supreme Court.lOO In
Cleveland v. Policy Management Systems Corporation,'O' the Court
considered "whether an application for, or receipt of, disability insur-
ance benefits under the Social Security Act creates a rebuttable presump-
tion that the applicant or recipient is judicially estopped from asserting
that she is a 'qualified individual with a disability' under the Americans
with Disabilities Act."'102
In Cleveland, the plaintiff suffered a stroke while on the job and
took a leave of absence. 103 She was unable to return to work immediate-
ly, so she filed an application for social security disability benefits. 104
Eight months later, the plaintiff's doctor released her to return to work
96. See Haschmann v. Time Warner Entertainment Co., 151 F.3d 591, 603 (7th Cir. 1998).
97. See id.
98. See id.
99. Id.
100. See Cleveland v. Policy Management Sys. Corp., 119 S. Ct. 1597 (1999).
101. 119 S. Ct. 1597 (1999).
102. Cleveland v. Policy Management Sys. Corp., 119 S. Ct. 1597, 1601 (1999).
103. See id. at 1600.
104. See id.
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and anticipated an eventual recovery of nearly 100 percent. 105 Follow-
ing her return to work, the plaintiff had performance problems and
requested several accommodations, including computer training, permis-
sion to take work home in the evenings, a transfer of position, and a
counselor. 106 The employer denied each of these requests, and terminat-
ed the plaintiff three months later. 107 The plaintiff filed a discrimination
claim under the ADA, and the employer argued that the plaintiff was
judicially estopped from claiming she was "totally disabled" to the
Social Security Administration, while at the same time claiming she was a
"qualified individual with a disability" under the ADA.108 The Fifth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals agreed with the employer, holding that application
for, or receipt of, social security disability benefits creates a rebuttable
presumption that the claimant or recipient is judicially estopped from
asserting that she is a qualified individual with a disability.109
In vacating the Fifth Circuit's decision, the Supreme Court held that
there is no automatic judicial estoppel by asserting that one is totally
disabled for social security benefits, and then asserting that he or she is a
qualified individual with a disability.10 To support its decision, the
Court advanced several possibilities in which claims can co-exist under
the competing statutes. For instance, the Court noted that an ADA suit
claiming that the plaintiff can perform her job with reasonable accom-
modation may well prove consistent with an SSDI claim that the plaintiff
could not perform her own job (or other jobs) without it. 111 Finally, the
Court noted that it is perfectly acceptable under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure to advance alternative legal theories, regardless of
consistency, upon which recovery may be premised."l 2
However, despite recognizing the ability to plead both claims, the
Court further held that to survive a motion for summary judgment, a
claimant "cannot simply ignore the apparent contradiction that arises"
and therefore must proffer a sufficient explanation. 113 Therefore, the
105. See id.
106. See id.
107. Id.
108. See id.
109. Id. at 1600-01.
110. See id. at 1602 (stating that the two claims do not inherently conflict to an extent requiring
courts to apply a special negative presumption).
111. Id.
112. Id. at 1603 (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(2)).
113. Id.
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Court vacated the opinion of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals and
remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent
with its opinion.114
In light of the Court's decision, the majority of circuits have de-
clined to hold that an ADA plaintiff is judicially estopped from proving
her ADA claim simply because she has sought or received disability
benefits. 115 Nevertheless, the judicial estoppel argument logically applies
to workers' compensation and ADA cases, given the inherent tension
between the two laws. On the one hand, workers' compensation focuses
on the extent to which an injured worker cannot perform his or her job
as a result of an on-the-job accident.11 6 On the other hand, the ADA is
designed to obtain the highest possible productivity a disabled individual
can offer. 1' 7 Thus, "[tihe conflict in the system is obvious: an [injured
worker] receives maximum workers' compensation benefits by proving
that he or she is totally disabled, but receives maximum protection under
the ADA by establishing that he or she can perform the essential func-
tions of his or her job."118
2. EEOC Guidance
In an effort to resolve this tension, the EEOC issued its "Guidance
on the Effect of Disability Representations in Benefits Applications on
ADA Coverage" in February 1997. In that guidance, the EEOC set
forth its position that representations made in applications for social
security, workers' compensation, disability insurance and other disability
benefits should not be an automatic bar to ADA claims." 19
114. Id. at 1604.
115. See, e.g., Haschmann v. Time Warner Entertainment Co.,151 F.3d 591, 605 (7th Cir. 1998)
(declining to adopt a per se rule that a plaintiff is judicially estopped from asserting an ADA claim if
she received disability payments); Rascon v. U.S. West Communications, 143 F.2d 1324, 1332 (10th
Cir. 1998); Johnson v. Oregon, 141 F.3d 1361, 1367 (9th Cir. 1998); Moore v. Payless Shoe Source,
Inc., 139 F.3d 1210, 1212 (8th Cir. 1998); Griffith v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 135 F.3d 376, 383 (6th Cir.
1998); Talavera v. School Bd., 129 F.3d 1214, 1220 (1lth Cir. 1997); Swanks v. Washington Metro.
Area Transit Auth., 116 F.3d 582, 586-87 (D.C. Cir. 1997). But see McNemar v. Disney Store, Inc.,
91 F.3d 610 (3d Cir. 1996) (holding that an individual's statement to the SSA that he was disabled and
unable to work barred his subsequent ADA claim).
116. Gabel et al., supra note 5, at 415.
117. Gabel et al., supra note 5, at 415.
118. Gabel et al., supra note 5, at 415 (quoting William C. Martucci & Daniel B. Boatright, Con-
flict Between the Americans with Disabilities Act and State Workers' Compensation Law and Possible
Legislative Response, 20 EMPLOYMENT REL. TODAY 461,462 n.4 (1993-94)).
119. Jules L. Smith, At the Crossroads of the FMLA, the ADA and Workers' Compensation:
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The EEOC advanced several reasons for this guidance. First, it is
possible for an individual to meet the eligibility requirements for receipt
of disability benefits and still be a "qualified individual with a disabili-
ty" for ADA purposes.120 Specifically, in terms of workers' compensa-
tion, the definition of "disability" is distinct from the ADA's defini-
tion. 12 1 For example, as one commentator has argued, most workers'
compensation laws define disability more generally. These more general
definitions:
(a) permit generalized presumptions about an individual's
ability to work; (b) do not distinguish between marginal and
essential functions; (c) [look to] whether an individual is un-
able to do any kind of work for which there is a reasonably
stable employment market rather than whether s/he can per-
form the essential functions of a particular position; and (d) do
not consider whether an individual can work with a reasonable
accommodation. 12 2
Thus, they are distinguishable from the more rigid ADA definition of
disability.
Second, the EEOC Guidance rests on a strong public policy argu-
ment that individuals should not have to choose between applying for
disability benefits and vindicating their rights under the ADA.123
Moreover, according to the EEOC, the ADA's purposes and standards
are fundamentally different from the purposes and standards of other
statutory schemes. 124 To that end, the EEOC concluded in its guidance
that a determination of what, if any, weight to give to representations
made in support of applications for disability benefits depends on the
context and timing of the representations.1 25 Nevertheless, this remains
an area of potential conflict between the ADA, FMLA, and workers'
compensation laws.
Issues and Answers About Employee Leaves of Absence, A.B.A. CENTER FOR CONTINUING LEGAL
EDUCATION, May 7, 1998, at 22 (Westlaw, T98ELAB ABA-LGLED 31).
120. See id.
121. See id.
122. Id.
123. See id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
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V. PRACTICAL GUIDANCE FOR EMPLOYERS
As demonstrated, the ADA, FMLA, and workers' compensation laws
conspire to form a "Bermuda Triangle" for employers. However,
employers can minimize the headaches involved with employee leave by
integrating the following guidance into their personnel practices.
(1) Always request FMLA certification from an employee within
two working days of the beginning of an unforeseen leave or a leave
request.126 In the case of planned leave, the employee should provide
the certification prior to commencement of the leave period.
(2) Any policy of requiring fitness to return to work must be
uniformly applied, job-related, and consistent with business necessity to
comply with the ADA.127
(3) Maintain separate confidential medical examination files from
regular personnel files.128
(4) Remember that FMLA leave is distinct from the reasonable
accommodation requirement under the ADA. An employer cannot
reduce or diminish the twelve-week FMLA entitlement and it must be
provided without regard to the impact on business or operations.
Beyond those twelve weeks, however, an employee may or may not be
entitled to additional leave under the ADA. At that time, an employer
may consider whether the accommodation imposes an undue hardship
on its business.
(5) Remember that other federal and state discrimination laws
continue to apply when employees are on leave. This is particularly
important to remember when applied to pregnancy since that is routine
leave under the FMLA, while also protected by federal and state law.
(6) Create a leave policy that effectively integrates the FMLA, ADA,
and Workers' Compensation. Such a policy should include:
(a) Notice requirements
(b) Rights and responsibilities of employees
(c) Sample documentation
(d) Benefits and wages
(e) Return to work programs
126. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.305(c) (1999).
127. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.3 10(a) (1999).
128. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.500 (1999).
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(f) Terminable events
(g) Any applicable collective bargaining agreement provisions
(7) Administer leave policies consistently and maintain appropriate
record keeping to demonstrate compliance.
VI. CONCLUSION
While the waters surrounding this area of employment law may be
murky, employers can reduce the risk of turning a $20,000 workers'
compensation claim into a $200,000 ADA or FMLA claim by becoming
familiar with each of the laws and knowing when they apply. This can
be accomplished in several ways.
Primarily, integrating all three areas into an effective leave policy
will allow an employer not only to provide notice to employees, but it
will also establish a policy that can be flexible to employee leave that
may be susceptible to multiple coverage under the various leave entitle-
ment laws. In addition to implementing such a policy, employing
trained benefits coordinators to administer leave consistently and main-
tain appropriate records will also serveto lessen an employer's liability.
[VOL. 76:69
